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 Much attention has been given last years to the modelling of social systems, in 
economy as well as in anthropology or in political sciences. Among the phenomena 
considered as having a structuring power in social systems, imitation processes 
play a central role, completing and sometime competing with a more traditional 
economic approach based on the rational choice theory. 
But the diversity of mimetic rules employed by modellers proves that the 
introduction of mimetic processes into formal models can’t avoid the traditional 
problem of endogenization of all the choices, including the one of the mimetic laws. 
The aim of this article is to address this question starting from some studies about 
cognitive differences between humans and animals. This will lead us to propose a 
formal framework which has the advantage of endogenising mimetic processes and 
give a comprehensive description of a heterogeneous population structure at the 
behavioural level as well as at the level of the choices of mimetic laws. 
In order to illustrate this point, we will apply this formalism to a spatial 
evolutionary game.  
 
                                                 
* Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to David Chavalarias : 
chavalar@poly.polytechnique.fr 
2 
The specificity of Human mimetic processes     
  Scientists, to account for the extremely rich structures observed in human social 
systems, more and more often study mimetic processes. But this interest is not only due 
to the fact that mimetism is a component of human behaviour; after some theories10, the 
sophistication of pre-human mimetic processes could have been the first step in 
hominization toward human social organisation as we know it.  
In the literature of social systems modelling, two main processes of imitation have 
been defined. (1): in the traditional conception of Homo oeconomicus, some researchers 
considered payoffs-biased imitation i.e. imitation of the most successful agents in one’s 
neighborhood23. (2): a growing number of contributions are attempts to introduce what 
is called conformism, in the study of social phenomena5,6,11,25. Here, conformism is the 
propensity of individuals to adopt some behaviour when it has already been adopted by 
some of their neighbors, the propensity being relative to the frequency of that behavior 
in the neighborhood7. To a lesser extent, other imitation processes have been studied, 
among which we can mention (3): anti-conformism, the propensity of an individual to 
adopt the behavior of the minority3. This list of imitation processes is far from 
exhaustive and we can already notice that even for conformism or payoffs-biased 
imitation, several technical definitions have been proposed, either deterministic or 
probabilistic24. On the other hand, it also possible to propose models including several 
imitations laws, as some authors already began to do it8,14,18,19. 
 This raises an epistemological question for modellers. Which rule(s) for 
imitation should be considered depending on the social systems under study? Since the 
dynamics of the systems studied are very sensitive to the very definition of theses 
imitation rules, it is important to have a way to decide whether some rules are more 
suitable than others in the modelling of specific social phenomena. Moreover, since the 
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distribution of these rules for imitation should be set by the system itself, it would be 
interesting to have some models with self-adaptive imitation rules distribution. To 
address this question, we will adopt in the following sections, a definition of rule for 
imitation close to what has been called selective attention, i.e. a mechanism that enables 
someone to select in her environment a subset of people that she will learn  from.  This 
operation of selection is exactly the role of a mimetic rule. To be more precise we will 
consider to be an imitation rule any mechanism which, given the neighbourhood’s 
properties of an agent, her the personal state, and a cultural modifiable feature, points as 
output toward a particular member of the population, or a subgroup, from which the 
agent will be influenced to modify this modifiable feature (fig. 1). Typically, 
conformism – imitation of the agents with the most common features – or payoffs-
biased imitation – imitation of the most successful agents  - are such kinds of rules. By  
modifiable features we mean some features the agent can change by its own will on a 
 
Figure 1: Imitation rule is any mechanism which, given a social structure, 
your     personal state and a cultural modifiable feature, points as output 
toward a particular member, or a subgroup, of the population from which 
you will be influenced to modify this feature. 
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small time scales (within a day), like a cooperative vs. defective behavior, the colours of 
the clothes she wears, etc. We will oppose them to features changing on larger time 
scales (months, years) and depending on a global dynamics, like the social position of 
the agents, her cumulated payoffs, her reputation, etc. The information included in the 
neighbourhood properties can be very rich and include distributions of other modifiable 
or not modifiable features.   
Since the specificity of human mimetism seems to be a central point in the 
understanding of human social systems, the first thing to do is to try to catch some 
differences between human and animal imitation processes. What can be surprising for 
a non-specialist looking at recent researches in ethology is that a lot of features, which 
at first glance can be thought to characterize human behaviours, can be found in some 
particular species (syntactic communication, dialogue, sharing, teaching, punishment 
etc.)22. But some other features definitely seem to belong only to humans. Among 
them21: heterotechnic cooperation (cooperation of several individuals with distinct skills 
in order to achieve a given task), the use of polylithes26 (tools composed by several 
pieces assembled together by fastenings), individual learning of collective use of tools, 
or the narrative capacity. All these features have in common some very human specific 
abilities. First, they require a reflexive attitude from agents. Agents have to think 
themselves as a part of the surrounding world, which can be subject to same operations 
that she practices on external entities (non-self). Secondly, they require the capacity to 
jump from a cognitive level to its meta-level, i.e. a higher cognitive level where 
elements of the lower became objects submitted to transformation or recombination. 
The specificity of human meta-cognitive capacities is highlighted by several laboratory 
experiments showing that animals, contrary to humans, have very limited capacities to 
build meta-representations27. 
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As for mimetic processes, reflexivity and meta-representation capacities 
introduced a big gap between animal and human mimetic processes10. If - as Eric Gans 
says12 -, “prehuman imitation is non-reflexive; the subject has no knowledge of itself as 
a self imitating another”, humans are conscious that they are mimetic entities and in 
some extent, can monitor their mimetic behaviour27. From a formal point of view, this 
means that there is a loop between the agent’s actions and the mimetic dynamics. It is 
this loop that we will try to make more explicit in the following.  
Modelling meta-choices 
From the definition we took for imitation rules and the remarks of last section, we 
can now see the effects of human specific abilities on mimetic processes. When 
imitation processes become reflexive and subject to meta-representations: 
i) Rules for imitation became modifiable features by way of meta-rules 
application (figure 2-b-2),  
ii)  An imitation rule can operate reflexively controlling its own expression 
(figure 2-c). 
 
           Figure 2 
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Assumption i) says that if an imitation rules is a modifiable feature, it can be 
controlled by an other imitation rule, its meta-rule. Human mimetic processes can then 
be composed of several levels, the upper controlling the lower (fig 2-b-2). For a given 
modifiable feature, we can associate the chain of mimetic rules that control its 
expression. But this chain of mimetic rules ought to be finite since humans have only 
limited cognitive capacities.  Two   solutions arise for the last layer 
setup. First, it could be fixed for all lifetime by a biological evolutionary process. 
Secondly, it could evolve through social influence mechanism during the individual 
lifetime. If we retain the last solution, then the last layer ought to be composed by 
reflexive imitation rules. These special self-applying rules for imitation are then the 
keys for endogenization.  In a sense, human imitation rules have the particularity to be 
potentially their own meta-rules. On this basis we will propose some cognitive 
hypotheses:  
Cognitive hypotheses: 
1. Human mimetic systems can be composed of several meta-levels but their 
number is finite.  
2. In human cognitive systems, at all levels, rules for imitation are modifiable 
features. 
3. The last meta-level in a mimetic system loops on itself.     
As we saw it, ( . These hypothesis and the kinds of mimetic 
structures it implies enable us to adopt a new approach of the modelling of mimetic 
processes. With the introduction of these specific human capacities in formal models, a 
new kind of dynamics appears to modellers: dynamics on imitation rules and their meta-
rules. Their study should reveal some particular patterns similar to what can be observed 
)3()2()1 ⇒+
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in the organization of human societies, or at least, give us some powerful analogies to 
think human social systems. This also introduises a change in the methodology for 
formal studies. Since the set of mimetic rules has its own internal dynamics, the 
problem of the modeller is now A) to decide which mimetic structures agents can have 
(the number of meta-levels), and which set of imitation rules is relevant for the problem 
she tries to model; B) which attractors of the meta-mimetic dynamics ought to be 
considered.  
The answer to the first question depends of the cognitive capacities of the entities 
under study. Since imitation processes are comparison between several agents in order 
to select the one you will imitate, imitation supposes that these agents can be compared 
on some particular scale (the amount of their fortune, their reputation, the size of the 
group they belong to, etc.). The dimensions on which imitation processes will be able to 
operate will then depend on the cognitive level of the modelised population: the number 
of salient percepts its members will be able to extract from the environment and the way 
they will be able to make comparison between these percepts. The technological level of 
populations studied will also have a great influence on mimetic dynamics: technology, 
through the introduction of new aggregated data available for the agents (pools, surveys, 
etc.) and changes introduced in the topology of their neighborhood (radio, TV, e-mail, 
Internet, etc.), allows for new imitation rules definition and changes the means of 
diffusion of the existing ones.  
To answer the second question, we have to look closer at the mimetic dynamics 
themselves. The first studies about these systems indicate that the number of attractors 
of these dynamics is very limited compared to the complexity of the model, making the 
choice of an attractor reasonable.   
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An application of Meta-mimetism to a simple spatial game 
In this section we will apply the meta-mimetism formalism to the spatial game 
proposed by Novak and May in 199223. Although there have been a lot of developments 
based on this model24 and a wider number of models on emergence of cooperation, 
taking into account diverse social or cognitive structures1,2,9,15,16,25, its simplicity makes 
it a good example to start with. The aim of this section is not to present a new model for 
emergence of cooperation, but to give a concrete example of application of meta-
mimetism. Novak and May considered agents on a two dimensional toric lattice playing 
a two-players game each round with each agent of their neighbourhood. Players can 
only adopt one of two strategies: always cooperate, or always defect. The 
neighbourhood of a player is composed by the eight adjacent cells and, in case of 
models with self-interaction, its own cell. Following the structure of their article, we 
will present results concerning models with self-interaction. Similar results have been 
obtained without self-interactioni. In their model, when two agents play together, they 
receive a payoff of 1 if both cooperate (C), and 0 if both defect (D). In case they play 
different strategies, the one who defects gets a payoff of b>1 and the other gets 0. At the 
end of each round all agents change their behaviour to the behaviour of the most 
successful agent in their neighborhood. In case they are one of the most successful, they 
keep their strategy. It is a pure payoffs-biased mechanism.  
The main results of Nowak and May was that this spatial game generates a spatial 
structure within populations with coexistence of both C and D types for some particular 
value of b (1.8<b<2). The structures of theses spatial patterns vary also with b values 
from static fractal states to chaotic evolving structures. Outside the range [1.8,2], the 
behavior of agents is uniform, all D or all C across the population. 
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To extend this model in the meta-mimetism 
framework, we first have to choose a structure for the 
agents. For this first application, we will consider the 
simplest closed architecture: two levels, the modifiable 
features (D or C) and the meta-level with reflexive 
mimetic rules (figure 3). Although human cognitive 
imitation processes are probably much more complex, this structure will give us a good 
approach of these meta-dynamics.  
Figure 3 
As for imitation rules, we will extend the set of available imitation rules to the set 
of rules mentioned in first section:   
1. Maxi: the original payoffs-biased rule, “copy the most successful agent in your 
neighborhood”. 
2. Lmaj: the majority rule, “copy the majority” (conformism) 
3. Lmno: the minority rule, “copy the minority” (anti-conformism) 
We will add to this set a stochastic rule 
4. PDR (Proportional Density Rule): the stochastic conformist law: “copy a feature 
proportionally to its frequency in your neighborhood”1. 
This rule is obtained for example if you consider an agent that imitates at random 
in her neighbourhood. The algorithm used for the simulations presented here can be 
found in the methodology paragraph. 
                                                 
1 For all these rules: in case of equality, agents choose at random. But they change anything if they are 
one of the neighbors selected in the mimetic process.  
10 
To begin with, let us look at the behavior 
of these systems for b=1.9 and for a 
uniform initial distribution of imitation 
rules and actions. The parameters are 
corresponding to a chaotic regime in the 
original model. The statistics of these 
simulations are shown in figure 4. The 
first observation is that the system 
reaches very quickly its unique attractor 
(20 periods), which is mostly static (for a 
10 000 agents population, about a 
hundred of oscillators at the level of 
imitation rules, less than a dozen at the 
behavioral level). Moreover the path to 
this attractor is mostly the same along 
different simulations with a very low 
variance on the imitation rules 
distribution as well as on the distribution 
of behaviors. The distributions shown 
here are stable on the long run. The 
asymptotic state is heterogeneous at the 
imitation’s rules level as well as at the 
action’s rules level.  
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Figure 4: Evolution of the proportions of the different 
modifiable features with time (b=1.9 ; Ci=0.5). Error bars 
represent the standard deviation. They are too small to be 
visible for Lmno.  Statistics are done on 180 simulations 
On the initial four rules, only three are left, PDR having completely disappeared. 
The most common rule in the population is Lmaj (70%) followed by Maxi (20%). 
11 
 If we now look at the spatial 
distribution of the agent’s 
modifiable features (figure 5), we 
can notice a very strong 
structuration of the population. If  
Lmaj agents fill the majority of the 
space, Maxi agents tend to form 
clusters while Lmno agents are 
scattered on all the territory. As for 
behaviours, Lmaj cooperators tend 
to form small groups while Lmno 
cooperators are isolated. 
We did the precedent study for 
 and for the initial rate 
of cooperators Ci ranging between 
0.1 and 0.9. A detailed presentation 
of simulation results can be found 
on the 
5.21.2 ≤≤ b
webi.  From this study, we 
can conclude that the ranking of the 
proportions of the different rules for 
imitation is the same along all the parameter values studied. The variations of these 
proportions (between 0.05 and 0.33 for Max; 0.65 and 0.89 for Lmaj; 0.05 and 0.07 for 
Lmno) show that the different attractors are qualitatively similar: clusters of Maxi agents 
in ocean of Lmaj agents with scattered Lmno agents. PDR agents are never present at 
the attractor. From the four selected  laws   initially available,  only  three  are relevant 
in this game: Maxi, Lmaj and Lmno. 
 
Imitation rules level 
Behavioral level 
Maxi
Lmno
Lmaj 
Cooperators
Defectors 
Figure 5: Asymptotic spatial distribution of the different 
modifiable features. Each small square represents one 
agent. The population is composed by 10 000 agents. 
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As for the behaviours, the asymptotic state is similar to what can be seen in figure 
5, the size and number of clusters of cooperators being increasing with Ci. There is 
always a non null proportion of cooperators, between 5% (b=2.5, Ci=0.1) and 83% 
(b=1.2, Ci=0.9).   
This kind of organization is not altered if the updates of the different modifiable 
features are asynchronous and these results are not artefacts of the parallel update. An 
interesting thing is the very weak variation of Lmno along all the parameter space 
studied. This suggests that the major factor for variations of Lmno proportions is the 
topology of the network more than the other state parameters. An interesting research 
would then be the study of the influence of topology on anti-conformist populations. 
We begun to explore other settings of the model: continuous time, noisy updating 
and memory on past payoffs. The first experiments showed similar results: 
heterogeneous populations with strong attractors. The introduction of a memory on past 
payoffs increases the rate of cooperation in the population (We took for the payoffs Gi: 
Git+1 =g(t)+αGit , with α<1, and g(t) being the scores of agent i at time t).  
Conclusions 
 Observations of differences between human’s and animal’s meta-cognitive 
capacities has leaded us to propose some cognitive hypotheses on human mimetic 
processes. On this basis it is possible propose a framework for the modelling of human 
social systems which has the advantage of making mimetic processes endogenous and 
seems to have rich perspectives in explaining the emergence of structures in human 
societies. To give an example, we applied this formalism to a spatial game proposed by 
Nowak and May23. This allowed us to exhibit systems with stable self-regulated 
distribution of imitation rules and with heterogeneous distribution of behaviours and 
rules for imitation at the asymptotical states. Next step will be to apply this formalism to 
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more complex models, and particularly to those dealing with the emergence of 
cooperation.  
But this framework is also remarkable in the sense that it is specific to human’s 
cognitive capacities. The explanations it could lead to, about evolution of some features 
of human societies, will consequently also be able to explain why this evolution has 
been so different from what have been observed in the animal world. From this point of 
view, meta-mimetism offers a way of thinking the relation between biological and 
cultural evolution. The fact that our genome has remained unchanged for several 
thousand years while our societies underwent the fundamental changes we know, 
suggests that the major part of evolution of social systems is no more played at the 
biological level but at the cultural level. Since mimetic processes operate on a daily 
basis when biological processes operate on a lifetime basis, they changed radically the 
path of selection, structuring human societies. For example, in the application presented 
here, cooperators naturally form clusters, which are known to be more robust to 
defecting behaviours than isolated cooperators. We had a chance animals never had: the 
possibility to evolve on much smaller time scales than the biological one through very 
particular mimetic behaviours. With the same body, we can change our cultural habits, 
begin new lives or even experiment several lives at the same time. The 
exploration/exploitation trade off that Nature is doing through mutation/selection 
processes on generations time scale has been transposed at the individual time scale 
through mimetic processes.  The quick evolution of its entities is probably the real 
superiority of human social systems on animal systems.  
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Methodology 
The algorithm for the simulations presented in this paper is the following: 
Set up of the game:  
- Give a value for b (here 1.2≤b≤2.5). 
- Neighbourhood composed by the eight adjacent cells plus the agent’s cell. 
Initial Conditions: 
- Give the spatial distribution of imitation rules (here always uniform i.i.d)  
- Give the spatial distribution of behaviours (here: 0.1≤ Initial rate of 
cooperators ≤0.9, i.i.d). 
At each period, for each agent:   
- The imitation rule is used to update itself. For example, if agent A had the 
Lmaj type and if the majority of her neighbors have turned to Maxi since 
last round, A will adopt the Maxi rule. 
- The imitation rule (eventually new) is used to update the behavior. If A, a 
Maxi agent, played C last round but a D-player did strictly better than all 
A’s neighbors (A included), A will become a D-player. 
- The agent plays with her nine neighbours (herself included). 
- The new payoffs of agents are computed by summation of the nine scores 
of the two-players game. 
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Supplementary Informations 
I For detailed presentation of the simulation  presented here and example of simulations for the model 
without self-interaction see: http://chavalarias.free.fr/metamimetism.htm 
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